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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: 
WHAT CLAIMS GET PAID, AND FOR HOW MUCH? 
Catherine T. Harris and Ralph Peeples* 
Medical malpractice litigation lends itself to empirical research. This 
article draws on a unique dataset consisting of all the filed cases closed 
by a major medical malpractice insurer over a two-year period. Using 
this data, this article addresses two questions. First, what factors drive 
indemnity payments made in settlement of claims? Second, what factors 
drive the amount of those indemnity payments? We were able to assess a 
number of potential factors affecting case resolution that are rarely 
available to researchers. We find that the insurer’s internal assessment 
of potential liability, along with the number of experts designated by the 
parties, is a strong predictor of payment. We also find that once the 
decision to seek a settlement is made by the insurer, non-medical factors 
become significant. Specifically, the plaintiff’s age and marital status, as 
well as the number of experts designated by the plaintiff, are the most 
important predictors of the amount of payment. The severity of the 
plaintiff’s injury is not a reliable predictor of the amount of payment.  
  
 
*Professor of Sociology, Wake Forest University and Professor of Law (Emeritus) Wake Forest 
University 
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INTRODUCTION 
The topics of medical malpractice litigation and medical malpractice 
reform just don’t seem to go away. Several bills meant to reform the 
current system were introduced in the 115th Congress in 2017.1 The 
topics continue to receive academic attention.2 One might question the 
need to talk about medical malpractice reform at a time when no insurance 
crisis exists, and at a time when neither the number nor amount of paid 
indemnity claims is increasing.3 Still, as Mello et al.4 suggest, because 
there is no crisis, this is an appropriate time for thinking objectively about 
medical malpractice, and for reviewing what we know and what we don’t 
know.  
This article takes an empirical approach to two questions. First, what 
factors lead to a monetary recovery for medical malpractice plaintiffs? 
Second, if a payment is made, what factors affect the amount of the 
payment? In answering those two questions, we introduce factors rarely 
seen when analyzing medical malpractice litigation. We are able to do this 
thanks to our access to a closed claims database maintained by a medical 
malpractice insurer doing business in North Carolina. 
We also approach the data from a case perspective rather than a claim 
perspective. This is a less frequently traveled path in medical malpractice 
research.5 As Rahmati et al. have observed, this approach necessarily 
examines success rates from the plaintiff’s perspective, rather than from 
the defendant’s perspective.6 The distinction arises from the fact that a 
single lawsuit may name more than one defendant, whereas a claim 
always involves a single defendant.  
 
 1. See, e.g., American Healthcare Reform Act, H.R. 277, 115th Cong. (2017) and Saving Lives, 
Saving Costs Act, 115th Cong. (2017). See generally Michelle M. Mello et al., Medical Liability— 
Prospects for Federal Reform, in 376 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1806 (2017); Anand Parekh and G. William 
Hoagland, Medical Liability Reform in a New Political Environment, in 317 JAMA 1311 (2017).  
 2. See, e.g., Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR For Medical Malpractice 
Reform, 76 MD. L. REV. 247 (2017); Daniela Talmadge, Keeping Medical Liability Costs Down: How 
Captive Insurance and Damages Caps Could Help Control Rising Healthcare Costs, 43 J. CORP. L. 201 
(2017); Patricia Born and J. Bradley Karl, The Effect of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Market Trends, 13 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 718 (2016); Mohammad Rahmati et al., Medical Malpractice 
Claiming in Illinois, 1980-2010, 13 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 183 (2016); Jason A. Stamm et al., Medical 
Malpractice Reform for Today’s Patients and Clinicians, 129 AM. J. MED. 20 (2016). 
 3. Mello, supra note 1. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Mohammed Rahmati et al., Screening Plaintiffs and Selecting Defendants in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation: Evidence from Illinois and Indiana, Working Paper 2017 at 5 (hereinafter 
“Screening Plaintiffs”). 
 6. Id. at 35.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
 The number of medical malpractice claims and volume of medical 
malpractice litigation has been in decline for more than a decade.7 The 
average payout per physician has also declined.8 Liability insurance 
seems to be available, although the premiums for some specialties will be 
higher than for others (as they have always been). A number of factors 
may help explain these trends, but tort reform–damage caps in particular–
does not appear to be the principal factor. Meanwhile, fewer physicians 
are engaged in traditional private practice, with a practice unaffiliated 
with a hospital or medical center.9 Perhaps one or more of these trends 
will change, and medical malpractice litigation will again take center 
stage in the tort reform debate. History suggests that it will, given the 
various malpractice insurance crises of the past forty years.10 Regardless 
of what happens, this is a good time to review what we know, and what 
we don’t know, about medical malpractice litigation.  
When analyzed at the level of claims payment, without regard to the 
amount of payment, medical malpractice is a quite rational process, as 
researchers have frequently noted.11 Meritorious claims are paid, and non-
meritorious claims are not paid. A more difficult question arises with the 
amount of payment. Do the amounts paid to resolve a claim follow a 
pattern, or are they just random? 
Almost thirty years ago, Sloan and Hsieh analyzed both indemnity 
payments and the amount of those payments, relying on several sets of 
data.12 Comparing payment amounts to the level of the alleged severity of 
the injury, Sloan and Hsieh concluded that payments, in general, rose with 
severity of injury.13 They also noted, however, that payments within a 
given level of severity were quite variable.14 In this article, we also 
examine what factors are associated with payment, as well as what factors 
are associated with the amount of payment.  
 
 7. Mello, supra note 1; Paik, Bernard S. Black and David A. Hyman, The Receding Tide of 
Medical Malpractice Litigation: Part 1- National Trends, 10 J. EMP. LEG. STUDIES 612, 614 (2013). 
 8. Id. at 614. 
 9. Stamm, supra note 2. 
 10. See Nussbaum, supra note 2 at 263-264. 
 11. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and Public Policy (Harvard 
Univeristy Press 1985); Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 
JAMA 1599 (1989); Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on 
the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS OF INT. MED. 780 (1992); Frank A. Sloan, 
Suing for Malpractice (1993).  
 12. Frank A. Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the 
Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997 (1990). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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THE DATA 
We collected data from the closed files of a major North Carolina 
medical malpractice insurer. Our data consists of all filed lawsuits15 
involving one or more of the company’s insured physicians closed 
between 2013 and 2015. As a result, we have information on 229 separate 
lawsuits involving 339 defendants. 
 We were given access to the same information available to the 
company’s claims adjusters. We thus have extensive data over a wide 
variety of categories, many of which are rarely, if ever, made available to 
researchers. Our data is rich in detail. It is more extensive and more 
nuanced than the information typically provided to state insurance 
regulators, the sort of information many researchers rely on.  
Our data includes information on things such as the duration of the 
lawsuits, the outcome of the lawsuits, the severity of the injuries alleged, 
the medical specialties of the individual defendants, the amount (if any) 
paid to the plaintiff, and the expenses incurred by the insurer in defending 
each claim. We also collected information on the system and part of the 
body involved, the specific medical allegation made, the nature of the 
allegation made, and the specific allegations made by plaintiff’s counsel. 
We have information about the individual defendant’s involvement (e.g., 
attending, consulting, on-call) as well as the number of co-defendants. We 
collected demographic information as to the plaintiff’s gender, marital 
status, race, age, and type of insurance. We also counted the number of 
experts designated by plaintiff and defendant in each case. We have 
limited information about the number and amount of offers made by each 
side. Finally, we have the insurer’s internal assessment of liability for 
each case.  
In the tables below, we describe the data by several different attributes: 
1. Severity of alleged injury.  
We used the standard scale used by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners. That scale allows injuries to be classified on 
an ascending scale of severity. In Table 1, we report on the number of 
filed cases within each category, and the frequency with which claims in 
each category received an indemnity payment. 
 
 15. It is important to distinguish between “claims” and “lawsuits.” “Claims,” as tracked by the 
insurer, may or may not lead to indemnity payments, and may or may not develop into “lawsuits.” In 
addition, “lawsuits” may or may not begin as “claims.” We encountered a number of cases in which the 
filing of a lawsuit was the first indication the insurer had that a plaintiff was seeking compensation for his 
or her alleged injury. In this article, we report only on lawsuits—whether they first appeared as claims or 
not. 
4
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Table 1 
Lawsuits By Severity of Injury. 
Severity 








6 2.6 0 - - 




























19 8.3 6 31.6 
$414,916/ 
$287,250 
8 Grave 8 3.5 5 62.5 
$709,900/ 
$500,000 
9 Death 78 34.1 25 32.1 
$242,271/ 
$162,500 
Total  229 100.0 71 31.0  
Table 1 suggests several things. First, most of the alleged injuries were 
quite serious in nature: 157 of the 229 cases (68.6%) were graded at 
severity levels 6-9. This is not surprising. Pursuing a medical malpractice 
claim is expensive and time consuming.16 The potential recovery has to 
justify the time and money spent seeking it. The top-heavy nature of the 
alleged injuries is consistent with previous findings by Rahmati et al.17 
Second, two categories, “major permanent” and “death,” alone accounted 
for more than half of the cases. Third, while the average and median 
amounts recovered increase from severity level 3 (“minor temporary”) to 
severity levels 8 and 9 (“grave” and “death”), the increase overall can 
hardly be described as a straight line. For example, the average and 
median recoveries for severity level 6 (“major permanent”) are greater 
than the average and median recoveries for severity levels 8 (“grave”) and 
9 (“death”). Finally, the likelihood of obtaining payment, overall, is low 
(30.1%).  
 
 16. Stephen Daniels et al., It Was the Best of Times, it was the Worst of Times: The Precarious 
Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1798 (2002); Paul C. Weiler, The Case for 
No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 915 (1993). 
 17. Rahmati, supra note 2 at 184. 
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2. Specialty of Primary Defendant 
Some specialties were more frequently the subject of a lawsuit than 
others. Table 2 lists the ten medical specialties most often sued, using the 
specialty of the primary defendant.18 
 
Table 2 
Medical Specialties of Defendants 
Specialty of Primary Defendant Number of Lawsuits Percentage 
Radiology (diagnostic and internal) 21 9.2 
General Surgery 19 8.3 
Internal Medicine 18 7.9 




Emergency Medicine 17 7.4 
Vicarious (employer or practice) 13 5.7 
Orthopedic Surgery (no spine) 12 5.2 
Urology 11 4.8 
OB-GYN 10 4.4 
Total 155 67.7 
Twenty-five other specialties accounted for the remainder of the cases. 
While it is common in medical malpractice litigation to name the practice 
or the employer as an additional defendant, in only 13 cases was the 
practice or the employer in fact the primary defendant.  
3. Expenses Paid 
Defending a malpractice case is usually expensive. Expenses paid by 
the insurer varied greatly from case to case, from a low of $1,269 to a 
high of $3,335,633. The mean expense paid was $166,986 and the median 
expense paid was $90,599. The bulk of these expenses were attributable 
to the fees paid to defense counsel. 
 
 18. When multiple defendants were named in a single lawsuit, we defined the “primary defendant” 
on the basis of two questions. First, if an indemnity payment was made, we treated the defendant on whose 
behalf the highest payment was made as the primary defendant. Second, if an indemnity payment was not 
made, we treated the defendant to whom the highest expenses were charged as the primary defendant.  
6
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4. Indemnity Paid 
Sixty-nine of the 229 cases (30.1%) resulted in an indemnity payment 
to the plaintiff. As with expenses, the amount of indemnity paid varied 
greatly, from $4,618 to $2,479,384. The mean payment was $442,986 and 
the median payment was $237,500. Of these sixty-nine cases, only one 
was the result of a plaintiff’s verdict at trial. A second was the result of 
binding arbitration. The remaining sixty-seven cases in which an 
indemnity was paid were settlements.  
5. Attorneys 
Plaintiffs in the 229 cases were represented by 128 different attorneys. 
In sixteen of the cases, the plaintiff appeared pro se.19 In contrast, the 
defendants were represented by only 25 different attorneys from fourteen 
law firms. Five of those 25 defense attorneys accounted for more than half 
(119) of the 229 cases.   
6. Medical Allegation and Nature of Allegation 
The specific allegations made in the complaint were translated by the 
insurer into “medical allegations.” A total of 36 different medical 
allegations appeared in the data. The most frequently occurring medical 
allegations were “treatment, inappropriate or incomplete” (n=46), “failure 
to recognize complications” (n=24), and “treatment, injury apart from 
intended treatment of care” (n=23). The specific allegations made in the 
complaint were also categorized by “nature of allegation.” More than 80% 
of the cases fell into three categories. Seventy of the cases were described 
as “surgery related,” 68 cases were described as “treatment related,” and 
54 cases were described as “diagnosis related.” 
7. Demographics 
Plaintiffs were almost evenly divided by gender (111 males, 117 
females), and ranged in age from less than one year old to 91. The mean 
age of plaintiffs was 49.7 and the median age was 52.  
Tables 3, 4, and 5 describe the marital status, race, and the plaintiffs’ 
type of medical insurance. However, because marital status, race, and 
type of insurance of the plaintiff were not always recorded, we are unable 
to account for all plaintiffs.  
 
 19. In only one of those sixteen cases did the pro se plaintiff recover.  
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Table 3 
Marital Status of Plaintiffs 
Marital Status Number Percentage 
Single 18 7.9 
Married 118 51.5 
Divorced 15 6.6 
Widowed 10 4.4 
Child Under 18 6 2.6 
Infant (under 1 year) 9 3.9 
Unknown 53 23.1 
Total 229 100.0 
Table 4 
Race of Plaintiffs 
Race Number Percentage 
Caucasian 124 54.1 
African-American 35 15.3 
Hispanic 2 0.9 
Other 5 2.2 
Unknown/ No Record 63 27.5 
Total 229 100.0 
Table 5 
Type of Medical Insurance 
Type of Insurance Number Percentage 
Private 73 31.9 
Medicaid 19 8.3 
Medicare 65 28.4 
Military 1 0.4 
Workers’ Compensation 4 1.7 
None 3 1.3 
Unknown/ No Record 64 27.9 
Total 229 99.9 
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8. Number of Experts 
Typically, experts are called to describe the relevant standard of care 
for the defendant physicians.20 In fact, North Carolina law requires the 
plaintiff to assert in the complaint that he or she has obtained a favorable 
opinion from an expert in the relevant medical field.21 As a result, expert 
testimony is common in medical malpractice litigation.22 However, 
because we collected data on all filed medical malpractice cases, not all 
of the cases we examined involved the use of experts. Most of these cases 
were simply dismissed before experts had to be designated. In addition, a 
few cases relied on a “res ipsa loquitur” theory, in which an expert might 
not be necessary.  
 In 184 of the cases, defense experts were identified. The number of 
defense experts designated per case ranged from 1 to 14; the mean was 
3.44 and the median was 3. Plaintiff’s experts were identified in 170 of 
the cases. The number of plaintiff’s experts ranged from 1 to 29; the mean 
was 2.80 and the median was 2.00. Thus, defense experts generally 
outnumbered plaintiffs’ experts.   
9. Venue, Trials, and Appeals 
All of the cases were filed and concluded in North Carolina. Lawsuits 
came from 51 of North Carolina’s 100 counties. The three most frequent 
venues were Wake County (Raleigh) (n=31); Mecklenburg County 
(Charlotte) (n=23); and New Hanover County (Wilmington) (n=20). 
Twenty-six cases (11.4%) went to trial, but only seventeen ended in a 
verdict. One case was arbitrated. Three defense verdicts were appealed. 
All three were affirmed. 
10. Outcomes  
Table 6 describes the final outcomes of the 228 lawsuits. 
  
 
 20. Catherine T. Struve, The Adversary System and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability 
Litigation, 72 FORDH. L. REV. 943, 976 (2004). 
 21. N.C.GEN.STAT. section 90-21.12; N.C.R. C.P. 9(j).  
 22. Tom Baker, The Medical Maplractice Myth 16 (2005); Frank A. Sloan et al., Suing for Medical 
Malpractice 5-6 (1993). 
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Table 6 
Final Outcome of Cases Filed 
Outcome Number Percentage 
Involuntary Dismissal 13 5.7 
Voluntary Dismissal, 
no Money Received 
102 44.5 
Summary Judgment for Defendant(s) 5 2.2 
Defense Verdict  
Following Trial 
16 7.0 
Settled for Costs 20 8.7 
Voluntary Dismissal,  
Money Paid to Plaintiff 
71 31.0 




Award for Plaintiff 
1 0.4 
Total 229 100.0 
The results in Table 6 are not surprising.23 Voluntary dismissals, with 
no money paid by the defense, were the most frequent outcome (n=102, 
44.5%). Plaintiffs recovered money in only 31% of the cases, regardless 
of the amount recovered. Treating binding arbitration as a trial, 
defendants prevailed at trial over 91% of the time (21 of 23 cases).  
 
11. Liability Rating 
After a lawsuit has been filed, the insurer reviews the relevant medical 
records and makes an internal determination of the insured’s liability. 
Liability is then rated according to a five-category scale: clear, probable, 
questionable, unknown, and none. Table 7 summarizes the liability 
assessments made by the insurer. 
 
 23. These results are comparable to results reported in other studies from other states. 
10
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Table 7 
Liability Assessments of Insurer 
Liability Rating Number Percentage 
Clear 10 4.7 
Probable 36 16.7 
Questionable 26 12.1 
Unknown 44 20.5 
None 99 46.0 
N=215. In 14 cases, a liability rating was not available. 
FINDINGS 
We set out to answer two questions: first, what factors predict an 
indemnity payment24 to the plaintiff and second, when a payment is made, 
what factors predict the amount of that payment.  
Predicting Payment 
Overall, 69 of 229 plaintiffs (30.1%) received an indemnity payment. 
We found a very strong correlation between the insurer’s internal 
assessment of liability (Table 7) and the payment of money to the 
plaintiff. A simple linear regression using only liability rating as an 
independent variable was highly significant (p= .000, R-square= .640).25 
When two additional independent variables were added (number of 
plaintiff’s experts and number of defense experts) the model remained 
highly significant, and the R-square increased to .669. However, “liability 
 
 24. By “indemnity payment,” we mean money actually paid to the plaintiff. As noted in Table 6, 
twenty cases were “settled for costs,” meaning that the insurer agreed to pay some or all or the plaintiff’s 
counsel’s expenses, but did not pay money to the plaintiff.  
 25. “R-squared,” also known as the coefficient of determination, is a statistical measure of the 
relationship between two variables. It is a measure of the extent to which the behavior of one variable can 
predict the behavior of a second variable. By convention, it can vary between 0 and 1.00. Our reported R-
squared value of .640 indicates a strong correlation between the insurer’s internal assessment of liability 
and the eventual payment of a claim. Our reported R-squared value of .669 suggests an even stronger 
correlation between the insurer’s internal assessment of liability, the number of plaintiff’s experts, and the 
number of defense experts with the eventual payment of a claim. The inference is that these variables 
drive the decision by the insurer to make an indemnity payment. Regression analysis (reported at Tables 
9 and 10, infra) is closely related to the concept of R-squared. Regression analysis determines the 
relationship between one or more independent variables and a dependent variable (in this paper, the 
amount of payment made to the plaintiff). See generally Alan Agresti and Barbara Finlay, Statistical 
Methods for the Social Sciences 394 (3d ed. 1997). 
11
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rating” was the strongest single predictor. Table 8 shows the relationship 
between “liability rating” and payment. 
Table 8 









Clear 10 0 100 10 
Probable 34 2 94.4 36 
Questionable 16 10 61.5 26 
Unknown 6 38 13.6 44 
None 2 97 2 99 
Total 68 147 31.6 215 
 *A liability rating was not available for 14 of the cases. 
 
Further evidence of the predictive value of the insurer’s internal 
liability rating comes from the 22 cases that went to trial and the one case 
that went to binding arbitration (Table 6). Defendants won five motions 
for summary judgment and obtained 16 defense verdicts. Plaintiffs 
prevailed only once at trial and once in binding arbitration.  
Of the 21 cases won by the defendant, the insurer’s liability rating 
included one “questionable” case, three “unknown” cases, and 17 “no 
liability” cases. In contrast, the single plaintiff’s verdict and the binding 
arbitration award were both from cases with liability rated as “probable.”  
 Predicting The Amount of Payment 
The fact that the insurer concluded that its insured is likely liable in a 
claim for malpractice tells us very little about the amount that will be 
necessary to settle the case. A simple linear regression indicates that the 
relationship between “liability rating” and the amount of the indemnity 
paid is statistically insignificant. Once the determination to seek a 
settlement has been made, other factors become important in answering 
the question of “how much?” Table 9 describes the factors that affect the 
amount of the indemnity paid, using multiple regression analysis. 
12
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Table 9 
Factors Affecting Amount of Indemnity Paid 
Independent Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficients t p 
Demographic    
Age of plaintiff -.272 2.020 .048 
Is plaintiff married? .243 2.266 .027 
Is plaintiff a child  
under 18? 
-.170 -1.205 .233 
Gender .063 .599 .552 
Medical    
Severity of injury -.074 -.705 .484 





Nature of allegation 
treatment related 
-.085 -.803 .425 
Legal    
Number of plaintiff’s 
experts 
.482 4.405 .000 
Constant  1.988 .051 
R-squared = .419    
Model significance = .000    
  
When race of the claimant is added as a demographic factor, the results 
stay significant, and the R-squared increases, but at a price: the race of the 
claimant was available in 166 of the 229 cases (72.5%). Of the 166 cases 
in which race was identified, 124 claimants were classified as Caucasian, 
and 42 were classified as non-Caucasian.  
13
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Table 10 
Factors Affecting Amount of Indemnity Paid 
Independent Variables 
Standardized 
Coefficients t p 
Demographic    
Age of plaintiff -.322 -2.294 .026 
Is plaintiff married? .198 1.773   .082 
Is plaintiff a child  
under 18? 
-.187 -1.262 .212 
Gender .091 .849 .400 
Is plaintiff Caucasian? .107 .998 .322 
Medical    
Severity of injury -.087 -.790 .433 





Nature of allegation 
treatment related 
-.099 -.908 .368 
Legal    
Number of plaintiff’s 
experts 
.480 4.316 .000 
Constant  1.150 .255 
R-squared = .445    
Model significance = .000    
 
 Comparing Tables 9 and 10, two variables remain significant: the age 
of the plaintiff and the number of plaintiff’s experts. Neither race nor 
gender are significant predictors. Marital status is a significant predictor 
in Table 9, but not in Table 10. None of the medical variables are 
significant predictors, although the variable “nature of allegation 
diagnostic related” approached significance in both models.  
14
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Severity of injury was not a significant predictor of the amount of 
payment in either of the two models described above. In that sense, our 
findings are at variance with Sloan and Hsieh’s findings, discussed 
earlier.26 One reason for this is the fact that the highest severity level—
death—resulted in lower average and median payments than those 
associated with all other severity levels, except severity level 3 (“minor 
temporary”).27 When death cases are removed from the analysis, “severity 
of injury” is not a significant predictor of the amount of payment, but the 
R-squared result improves to .553. While there is some evidence of 
“vertical equity” in the indemnity payments (Table 1), the average and 
median payment amounts do not increase in orderly fashion. This may be 
due, however, to the relatively small numbers we report.  
We found large disparities in the amount of indemnity payments within 
given levels of severity. For example, the six indemnity payments made 
for severity level 3 (minor temporary injuries) ranged from $4,618 to 
$395,000 ($97,056 mean, $42,500 median) and the twenty-five indemnity 
payments for severity level 9 (death) ranged from $10,000 to $750,000 
($242,271 mean, $162,500 median). These results echo Sloan and Hsieh’s 
finding about the lack of “horizontal equity” in indemnity payments.28 
However, an examination of the attributes of the cases within those two 
levels of severity provide plausible reasons for the disparity of payment. 
For the twenty-five death cases, the age of the claimant ranged from infant 
under one year old to 91. The liability ratings also varied, suggesting that 
the insurer and plaintiff’s counsel adjusted the amounts offered and 
demanded in light of the probable outcome at trial.  
DISCUSSION 
It is no accident that out of twenty-two trials and one arbitration, the 
plaintiff prevailed only twice—a success rate of 8.7%. The insurer acts 
rationally, settling the cases it believes it may lose, and refusing to settle 
cases it believes it will win. The strong correlation between the insurer’s 
liability rating and the eventual outcome of the cases (Table 8) bears this 
point out.  
The overall payment rate noted in Table 1 (30.1%) is lower than that 
reported in other studies.29 This is somewhat surprising because the data 
consist of filed civil lawsuits, cases in which plaintiff’s counsel at least 
 
 26. Sloan and Hsieh, supra note 12. 
 27. “Death” cases indemnities are typically less than indemnity payments for major permanent, 
significant permanent, and grave injuries. Charles Silver et al., Policy Limits, Payments and Blood Money, 
5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 559, 572 (2015).  
 28. Sloan and Hsieh, supra note 12. 
 29. Rahmati, Screening Plaintiffs, supra note 5.  
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initially felt had a chance of success. However, in sixteen of these cases 
the insurer incurred defense costs of less than $5,000, suggesting that 
plaintiff’s counsel abandoned those cases early in the litigation process.30 
When those cases are removed, the overall payment rate improves to 
33.3%. A liability rating was available for 13 of these 16 cases. Twelve 
were rated as “no liability” and one was rated as “unknown liability.” It 
comes down to case-picking, and some plaintiff’s counsel are clearly 
better at that than others.31 
The strong connection between the insurer’s internal liability rating and 
eventual payment of an indemnity reflects the fact that medical 
malpractice litigation is seldom a contest between equally matched 
opponents. The insurer has access to internal reviews from physicians 
practicing in the state along with an experienced set of adjusters. Put more 
broadly, the insurer is a repeat player working with access to a substantial 
history of claims, their disposition, and what they may be worth. In 
addition, the insurer relies on a small number of defense counsel (25 in 
this study) to defend 229 lawsuits, or an average of over nine lawsuits per 
attorney. Thus, in the context of medical malpractice litigation, defense 
counsel are themselves repeat players. The same cannot be said about 
plaintiff’s counsel. The 229 plaintiffs were represented by 128 different 
lawyers, an average of less than two lawsuits per attorney. As a result, 
plaintiff’s counsel can expect to be opposed by defense counsel of at least 
equal, and probably greater experience in medical malpractice litigation. 
Once again, astute case-picking seems to be the critical skill for a 
plaintiff’s lawyer to have.  
The number of plaintiff’s experts was the strongest predictor of the 
amount of the indemnity paid. This, too, makes sense. The number of 
experts a plaintiff can recruit depends upon the strength of the plaintiff’s 
case. It also depends upon the amount of money plaintiff’s counsel is 
willing to spend, and the amount of money plaintiff’s counsel believes 
can be recovered. The number of defense experts, relative to the number 
of plaintiff’s experts, had little impact on the amount paid. In only 13 of 
the 71 cases in which money was paid did the number of plaintiff’s 
experts exceed the number of defense experts. In the remaining 
“indemnity paid” cases, the number of plaintiff’s experts was either less 
than or equal to the number of defense experts.  
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Plaintiff lawyers who specialize in medical malpractice are notoriously picky about the cases 
they take on, but some plaintiff’s lawyers are pickier than others. See David A. Hyman, Medical 
Malpractice Litigation and the Market for Plaintiff-Side Representation: Evidence from Illinois, 13 J. 
EMP. LEGAL STUDIES 603 (2016). 
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CONCLUSION 
There is evidence of rationality not only in the fact of payment, but in 
the amount of payment made. The determination of what claims will be 
paid is largely a function of the insurer’s assessment of liability. The 
determination of amount of payment seems to be affected by non-medical 
factors, specifically the number of plaintiff’s experts, the plaintiff’s age, 
and the plaintiff’s marital status. These results should not be surprising. 
Medical factors, as reflected in the insurer’s liability rating, are taken into 
account in making the determination to settle the claim. Once that 
decision is made, non-medical factors become more important, such as 
the apparent strength of the plaintiff’s case (the number of experts), the 
plaintiff’s age, and the plaintiff’s marital status. In light of the relatively 
small number of cases examined in this study, further research would be 
useful. 
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